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2017 National Environmental Law Moot Court 
Competition Problem*
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT 
 
September Term, 2016 
Docket No. 16-0933 
 
CORDELIA LEAR, 
                                 Plaintiff–Appellee–Cross Appellant, 
v. 
UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, 
Defendant–Appellant–Cross Appellee, 
and 
BRITTAIN COUNTY, NEW UNION, 
Defendant–Appellant. 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of New Union in No. 112-CV-2015-RNR, Judge 




* Grayed out text denotes a change from the original Problem in response to official 
Competition Q&A period. 
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ORDER 
Following the issuance of an Order of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Union dated June 1, 2016 in 112-
CV-2015-RNR, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“FWS”) and Brittain County, New Union each filed a Notice of Ap-
peal on June 9, 2016.  Thereafter, Cordelia Lear filed a Notice of 
Appeal on June 10, 2016. 
Lear takes issue with the district court’s determination that 
the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 
(2012), is a legitimate exercise of congressional power under Arti-
cle I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, as applied to a 
wholly intrastate population of Karner Blue Butterfly. 
FWS takes issue with the district court’s decision with respect 
to its holding: that Lear’s claim for an uncompensated taking un-
der the Fifth Amendment was ripe since Lear did not apply for an 
Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”) contemplated by ESA § 10, 16 
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B); that the relevant parcel for the purpose of 
Lear’s takings claim based upon complete deprivation of economic 
value under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992) is the Cordelia Lot as subdivided in 1965 and not the 
entirety of Lear Island; that the potential future natural destruc-
tion of the Cordelia Lot’s lupine fields, which are the butterflies’ hab-
itat, does not preclude Lear’s takings claim; that the Brittain 
County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay $1,000 annually as rent for 
wildlife viewing did not preclude Lear’s takings claim based upon 
complete deprivation of economic value; that the public trust prin-
ciples inherent in Lear’s title do not preclude her takings claim; and 
that the ESA as administered by FWS and a Brittain County, New 
Union Wetlands Preservation Law combine to deprive the Cordelia 
Lot of all economic value. 
Brittain County agrees with FWS regarding all aspects of Lear’s 
takings claim, but agrees with Lear that the ESA is unconstitutional 
as applied to the wholly intrastate population of Karner Blue Butter-
fly. 
This Court has previously determined it has jurisdiction of 
the case and that the Federal Circuit does not. 
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that each of the parties brief all 
of the following issues: 
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1. Is the ESA a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce power, 
as applied to a wholly intrastate population of an endan-
gered butterfly that would be eliminated by construction of 
a single-family residence for personal use?  (FWS argues 
the ESA is a valid exercise of the Commerce power; Lear 
and Brittain County argue it is not.) 
 
2. Is Lear’s takings claim against FWS ripe without having ap-
plied for an ITP under ESA § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)? 
(Lear argues it is ripe; FWS and Brittain County argue it is 
not.) 
 
3. For takings analysis, is the relevant parcel the entirety of 
Lear Island, or merely the Cordelia Lot as subdivided in 
1965? (FWS and Brittain County argue the entire island is 
the relevant parcel; Lear argues the Cordelia Lot is.) 
 
4. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, does the 
fact that the lot will become developable upon the natural 
destruction of the butterfly habitat in ten years shield the 
FWS and Brittain County from a takings claim based upon 
a complete deprivation of economic value of the property? 
(FWS and Brittain County argue the butterfly habitat’s 
natural destruction in the future precludes Lear’s takings 
claim; Lear argues it does not.) 
 
5. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, does the 
Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay $1,000 per 
year in rent for wildlife viewing preclude a takings claim for 
complete loss of economic value? (FWS and Brittain County 
argue it does; Lear argues it does not.) 
 
6. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, do public trust 
principles inherent in title preclude Lear’s claim for a taking based 
on the denial of a county wetlands permit? (FWS and Brittain 
County argue public trust principles preclude Lear’s takings 
claim; Lear argues they do not.) 
 
7. Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, are FWS 
and Brittain County liable for a complete deprivation of the 
3
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economic value of the Cordelia Lot when either the federal or 
county regulation, by itself, would still allow development of 
a single-family residence? (Lear argues that even though the 
regulations would not individually amount to a taking under 
Lucas, the ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preserva-
tion Law together completely deprive the Cordelia Lot of all 
economic value; FWS and Brittain County argue that the 
ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law 
must be considered separately and thus do not completely de-
prive the Cordelia Lot of all economic value.) 
 
SO ORDERED. 
Entered this 1st day of September, 2016. 
 
[NOTE: No decisions entered or documents dated after September 
1, 2016 may be cited in briefs or oral arguments.] 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF NEW UNION 
------------------------------------------------  X 
CORDELIA LEAR,                      ) 
        Plaintiff,                               ) 
                                                        ) 
v.                                                     )      112-CV-2015-RNR 
                                                        )      Decision and Judgment 
UNITED STATES FISH AND    ) 
WILDLIFE SERVICE,                 ) 
        Defendant,                            ) 
                                                        ) 
and                                                 ) 
                                                        ) 
BRITTAIN COUNTY, NEW        )  
UNION                                           ) 
        Defendant.                            ) 
------------------------------------------------  X 
This case involves the application of the Endangered Species 
Act (“ESA”) and a municipal wetlands law to Plaintiff’s property 
on Lear Island in Brittain County, New Union.  Lear Island con-
tains the last remaining habitat for the New Union subpopulation 
of the Karner Blue Butterfly, a federally listed endangered species.  
Plaintiff seeks to build a single-family house for her own use on her 
irregularly shaped ten-acre property on Lear Island. Plaintiff chal-
lenges the constitutionality of the ESA as applied to her situation 
and asserts a claim against both the Fish and Wildlife Service 
(“FWS”) and Brittain County for an uncompensated taking of her 
property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.1 
 
1. Lear waived any damages in excess of $10,000 in her takings claim against 
the United States of America, allowing her to proceed with her claim in this Court.  
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1); Chabal v. Reagan, 822 F.2d 349, 353 (3d 
Cir. 1987); Shaw v. Gwatney, 795 F.2d 1351, 1356 (8th Cir. 1986); Goble v. Marsh, 
5
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A seven-day bench trial was held before this Court. Based on 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth below, this 
Court enters judgment: 1) dismissing Lear’s claim seeking a decla-
ration that the ESA is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative 
power as applied to her property; 2) awarding damages of $10,000 
in Lear’s favor against the FWS for an unconstitutional taking of 
her property in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion; and 3) awarding damages in the amount of $90,000 against 
Brittain County for an unconstitutional taking of Lear’s property 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1.  Lear Island is an island in Lake Union and is approxi-
mately two miles long and one mile wide, consisting of 1,000 
acres.  Lake Union is a large interstate lake, which has been tra-
ditionally used for interstate navigation.  Lear Island was 
granted to Cornelius Lear in 1803 by an Act of Congress.  At the 
time, present-day New Union was part of the Northwest Terri-
tory.  The 1803 grant included title in fee simple absolute to all of 
Lear Island and to “all lands under water within a 300-foot radius 
of the shoreline of said island,” as well as an additional grant of 
lands under water in the shallow strait separating Lear Island 
from the mainland. 
2.  Cornelius Lear and his descendants have occupied Lear Is-
land since the 1803 grant, using the island as a homestead, farm, 
and hunting and fishing grounds.  During the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, the island was a productive farm, and produce 
was carried by boat from the island to the mainland.  The original 
homestead is still located close to the north end of the island, near 
the strait that separates the island from the mainland.  In the early 
twentieth century, the Lear Family constructed a causeway con-
necting the island to the mainland by road. 
3.  In 1965, King James Lear owned the entirety of the 1803 
Lear Island grant.  As part of an estate plan, King James Lear de-
termined to divide Lear Island into three parcels, one for each of 
his daughters Goneril, Regan, and Cordelia.  The Brittain Town 
Planning Board approved the subdivision of the property into three 
 
684 F.2d 12, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  She did not waive damages in excess of $10,000 
against Brittain County. 
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lots: the 550-acre Goneril Lot, the 440-acre Regan Lot, and the 10-
acre Cordelia Lot2  At the time of the subdivision, the Brittain 
Town Planning Board determined that each lot could be developed 
in conformance with zoning requirements with at least one single-
family residence.  King James Lear then deeded each of the lots, 
respectively, to his three daughters, reserving a life estate in each 
lot for himself.  Shortly after deeding the properties to his daugh-
ters, King James Lear constructed a residence on the Regan lot, for 
use by his daughter Regan.  He continued to live in the homestead, 
located on the Goneril Lot. 
4.  King James Lear died in 2005, and each of the three daugh-
ters came into possession of their deeded properties.  In 2012, 
Plaintiff Cordelia Lear decided to build a residence on her lot. 
5.  The Cordelia Lot is situated at the northern tip of Lear Is-
land.  The lot consists of an access strip that is 40 feet wide by 1,000 
feet long, and an open field that comprises the remaining nine 
acres of uplands.  In addition, there is about one acre of emergent 
cattail marsh in a cove that historically was open water and was 
historically used as a boat landing. 
6.  The nine-acre open field and access strip has been kept open 
by annual mowing by the Lear Family for several decades.  The fam-
ily has referred to the Cordelia Lot as “The Heath” because it was 
kept open, unlike the rest of the island, which naturally became 
wooded after agricultural use of the island ceased in 1965.  The Heath 
was kept open by annual mowing each October. 
7.  The Heath and the access strip have become covered with 
wild blue lupine flowers, which thrive in the sandy soil of Lear Is-
land.  Fields of wild blue lupines are essential for the survival of 
Karner Blue larvae, which can only feed on the leaves of blue lu-
pine plants.  The ideal habitat for the Karner Blues consists of par-
tially shaded lupine flowers near successional forests. 
8.  The Karner Blue is an endangered species.  50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.11 (2015).  It was added to the federal endangered species list 
on December 14, 1992.  57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 14, 1992). 
9.  Although populations of Karner Blues survive in other 
states, the only remaining population of the butterfly in New Un-
ion lives on the Heath on Lear Island.  Karner Blues do not 
 
2. The acreage figures do not include deeded lands underwater. 
7
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migrate.  Instead, eggs are laid in the fall, overwinter, and 
hatch in the spring.  A second brood hatches in the summer. Kar-
ner Blue larvae remain attached to lupine plant foliage until they 
emerge from chrysalis as butterflies, and any disturbance of the 
lupines during the larval and chrysalis stages would result in the 
death of the butterflies.  Karner Blue populations have difficulty 
migrating to new habitats as their flight distance is short, and they 
must follow woodland edge corridors.  The New Union subpopula-
tion of Karner Blue is entirely intrastate and does not travel across 
any State boundaries. 
10.  The Heath, consisting of lupine fields adjacent to the succes-
sional forest on the Goneril lot, provides ideal habitat for the Karner 
Blues, which thrives in partially shaded lupine fields.  The access strip 
provides particularly good partially shaded habitat for Karner Blues.  
The Heath was designated by the FWS as critical habitat for the New 
Union subpopulation of the Karner Blues in 1992. 
11.  In April 2012, Cordelia Lear contacted the New Union 
FWS field office to inquire whether development of her property 
would require any permits or approvals because of the existence of 
the endangered butterfly population.  FWS agent L.E. Pidopter ad-
vised Plaintiff that any disturbance of the lupine habitat in the 
Heath other than continued annual mowing would constitute a 
“take” of endangered butterfly.  Pidopter also advised Plaintiff that 
it was possible to obtain an Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”) under 
section 10 of the ESA, but in order to file an application for such a 
permit, Ms. Lear would have to develop a habitat conservation 
plan (“HCP”) for the Karner Blues and an environmental assess-
ment document under the National Environmental Policy Act.  Pi-
dopter advised Ms. Lear that in order to be approvable, an HCP 
would have to provide for additional contiguous lupine habitat on 
an acre-for-acre basis, including any disturbance of the access 
strip.  Pidopter also advised that an approvable HCP would require 
a commitment to maintain the remaining lupine fields through an-
nual fall mowing. 
12.  The only land that is contiguous to the Heath is the Gon-
eril Lot.  Cordelia Lear is estranged from her sister, and Goneril 
Lear has refused to consider cooperating in any HCP that involves 
restrictions on her property. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/1
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13.  Cordelia Lear investigated the cost of preparing the re-
quired HCP for the Karner Blues, and was advised by an environ-
mental consultant that preparation of an application for an ITP, 
including the required HCP and environmental assessment docu-
ments, would cost $150,000. 
14.  Following Cordelia Lear’s inquiry to the FWS, the FWS 
New Union field office sent Cordelia Lear a letter on May 15, 2012 
confirming that her entire ten-acre property was a critical habitat 
for the Karner Blues and that any disturbance to the lupine fields 
other than annual mowing during the month of October would con-
stitute a “take” of the Karner Blues in violation of section 9 of the 
ESA.  The letter invited Plaintiff to submit an application for an 
ITP and referred her to the FWS’s Habitat Conservation Planning 
Handbook for information on how to develop an acceptable HCP to 
submit with an ITP application.  The FWS letter reiterated that an 
acceptable HCP would require, at a minimum, that all acreage of 
lupine field disturbed by development would have to be replaced 
with contiguous acreage, and that the property owner would have 
to commit to maintain the remaining and newly created lupine 
fields by annual mowing each October. 
15.  Without annual mowing, the lupine fields on the Cordelia 
Lot would naturally convert to a successional forest of oak and 
hickory trees, eliminating the Karner Blues’ habitat.  This process 
would take about ten years.  After ten years, this natural ecological 
process would result in the extinction of the New Union subpopu-
lation of the Karner Blues, unless a replacement habitat was cre-
ated within a one-thousand-foot radius of the existing fields. 
16.  Rather than pursue an ITP application with the FWS, Plain-
tiff developed an alternative development proposal (“ADP”) that 
would not disturb the lupine fields.  In the ADP, Plaintiff proposed to 
fill one half-acre of the marsh in the cove to create a lupine-free build-
ing site, together with an access causeway to provide access from the 
shared mainland causeway without disturbing the access strip.  As 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers considers this portion of Lake Un-
ion to be “non-navigable” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act 
of 1899, and because construction of residential dwellings involving 
one half-acre or less of fill is authorized by U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers Nationwide Permit 29, see Issuance of Nationwide Permit for 
Single-Family Housing, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,650 (July 27, 1995), no fed-
eral approvals would be required for this project. 
9
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17.  The ADP required a permit to fill the cove marsh, pursu-
ant to the Brittain County Wetland Preservation Law, which was 
enacted in 1982.  In August 2013, Plaintiff duly filed a permit ap-
plication with Brittain County Wetlands Board.  The permit was 
denied in December 2013, on the grounds that permits to fill wet-
lands would only be granted for a water-dependent use, and that a 
residential home site was not a water-dependent use. 
18.  The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot without any re-
strictions that would prevent development of a single-family house 
on the lot is $100,000.  Property taxes on the Cordelia Lot are 
$1,500 annually.  There is no market in Brittain County for a par-
cel such as the Cordelia Lot for recreational use without the right 
to develop a residence on the property, nor does the property have 
any market in its current state as agricultural or timber land.  
Plaintiff has not sought reassessment of her property following the 
denial of the permit under the Brittain County Wetland Preserva-
tion Law.  The Brittain County Butterfly Society has offered to pay 
Cordelia Lear $1,000 annually for the privilege of conducting but-
terfly viewing outings during the summer Karner Blue season, but 
she rejected the Society’s offer. 
19.  Plaintiff then commenced this action in February 2014, 
seeking a declaration that the ESA was an unconstitutional exer-
cise of congressional legislative power, or alternatively, seeking 
just compensation from FWS and Brittain County for a regulatory 
taking of her property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. THE ESA IS A VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S 
COMMERCE POWER. 
Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the “take” of any endangered 
species.  See ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).  The term 
“take” is defined by regulation to include “significant habitat mod-
ification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife 
by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including 
breeding, feeding or sheltering.”  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2015).  Citing 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Plaintiff argues that the ESA, by 
prohibiting the “take” of an intrastate species, seeks to regulate non-
economic activities such as land clearing and vegetation removal.  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/1
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Lopez and Morrison reflect that, when relying on the substantial 
aggregate effects of an activity on interstate commerce as the basis 
for regulation under the Commerce power, U.S. Constitution art. 
I, § 8, cl. 3, the relevant regulated activity must itself be economic 
in nature.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.  In Lopez, the Court 
struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act.  See 514 U.S. at 561.  
In Morrison, the Court struck down the Violence Against Women 
Act, which made certain gender motivated acts of violence a federal 
crime.  See 529 U.S. at 617.  In both cases, the Court held that 
Congress lacked authority under the Commerce power to regulate 
noneconomic activity. 
Plaintiff argues that the prohibition against “taking” an intra-
state species such as the Karner Blue, like gun possession and 
rape, are noneconomic activities that cannot support the assertion 
of legislative authority under the Commerce Clause.  However, this 
Court finds that the relevant activity is the underlying land devel-
opment through construction of the proposed residence, and that 
this activity is clearly an economic activity, involving as it does the 
purchase of building materials and the hiring of carpenters and 
contractors.  Although the Twelfth Circuit has not addressed the 
question, every court of appeals that has considered a Commerce 
Clause challenge to the ESA “take” prohibition has upheld the Act.  
This Court follows the weight of precedent and likewise holds that 
the ESA prohibition against an unpermitted “take” of a wholly in-
trastate species is a valid exercise of the Commerce power.  See 
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 
1177 (9th Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. 
Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1277 (11th Cir. 2007); Rancho Viejo, 
LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty 
Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640–41 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 505–06 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n 
of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
2. APPLICATION OF THE ESA INCIDENTAL TAKE 
PROHIBITION AND THE BRITTAIN COUNTY 
WETLANDS PRESERVATION LAW TO PLAINTIFF’S 
PROPERTY HAS RESULTED IN AN UNCOMPENSATED 
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Plaintiff also asserts a takings claim against FWS and Brit-
tain County.  Citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992), Lear argues that the application of ESA and Brit-
tain County Wetlands Preservation Law combine to deprive her of 
any economic use of her property,3 and thus constitute a regulatory 
“take” of her property requiring just compensation under the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use without just compen-
sation.”4  This Court concludes that the combined application 
of the ESA prohibition against “taking” the Karner Blue and 
the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law have resulted in 
the taking of Plaintiff’s property without compensation. 
A. Plaintiff’s Takings Claim Against the FWS is Ripe for 
Litigation. 
Defendant FWS argues that Plaintiff’s takings claim is not 
ripe, as Plaintiff never formally applied for an ITP, citing Morris v. 
United States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  However, 
a takings claimant need not perform a futile act, when the govern-
ment has already declared a policy of denying the very sort of per-
mit the claimant would need.  See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 626 (2001).  Here, the FWS advised Plaintiff that any ITP 
would of necessity include conditions that it would be impossible 
for Plaintiff to satisfy.  In addition, this Court finds that applica-
tion for a permit would be futile where it is undisputed that the 
cost of applying for a permit exceeds the fair market value of the 
property in question.  Pursuit of a permit is also unnecessary if a 
Plaintiff can establish that “the procedure to acquire a permit is so 
burdensome as to effectively deprive plaintiffs of their property 
rights.”  Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 164 (1996).5 
 
3. Plaintiff does not advance a claim for a partial regulatory taking based on 
the principles of Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–
28 (1978).  See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 317–18 (2002); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan-
ning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d 535 U.S. 302. 
4. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been incorpo-
rated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.  See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). 
5. Although no party addressed the issue before this Court, this Court notes 
that Plaintiff’s takings claim against Brittain County is similarly ripe, since the 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/1
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B. The Relevant Parcel for Takings Analysis is the Cor-
delia Lot, Not All of Lear Island. 
FWS and Brittain County argue that the relevant parcel for 
determining whether the ESA and Brittain County Wetlands 
Preservation Law restrictions allow some residual economic use of 
the lot should be the entire Lear Island, not just the Cordelia Lot.  
In their view, since Cordelia Lear received her property as a gift 
from her father, the relevant “investment backed expectations” for 
the economic value of the property should be based on her ances-
tor’s acquisition of the entirety of Lear Island by congressional 
grant in 1803.  The Defendants argue that the Lear family, having 
enjoyed and exploited the entirety of Lear Island for nearly two 
centuries before subdividing it into three lots, cannot now claim 
that it has been deprived of all economic value because one of those 
lots has restrictions.  They add that the Supreme Court has, in its 
more recent takings cases, rejected so-called “conceptual sever-
ance” arguments that would apply a takings analysis to just one 
portion of a combined property.  See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 
(2002) (rejecting claim based on current permissible uses of prop-
erty separate from future permissible uses after moratorium expi-
ration); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470, 500–01 (1987) (rejecting claim that “support estate” was dis-
tinct property for purpose of takings analysis of a Pennsylvania 
law that prohibited mining of coal support pillars); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (re-
jecting claim that air rights were distinct from existing surface use 
of property).  FWS and Brittain County argue instead for a “flexible 
approach” to determining the relevant parcel for takings analysis, 
which takes into account the value of other lots in the same subdi-
vision.  See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 
1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 
1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
Whatever the merits of this flexible approach, this Court re-
jects the application of such an approach where ownership of the 
 
Constitution of the State of New Union does not include a just compensation 
clause nor do the State’s statutes provide a procedure for seeking just compensa-
tion.  See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).   
13
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relevant lots has been transferred to different parties.  Formal sub-
division of a property into separate lots should be determinative.  
See Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1181.  There is no evidence that 
the subdivision was undertaken as a subterfuge to create a takings 
claim.  Accordingly, the relevant parcel for takings analysis is the 
Cordelia Lot. 
C. The Relevant Time Period for Takings Analysis is the 
Current Permissible Development of the Property. 
Citing Tahoe–Sierra, Defendants FWS and Brittain County 
argue that any restrictions on the Cordelia Lot should be consid-
ered temporary, since all Plaintiff would need to do is refrain from 
mowing her fields and after ten years the natural processes of suc-
cession will result in the elimination of the Karner Blues’ habitat.  
Although Tahoe–Sierra held that the imposition of a multiyear 
building moratorium was not a complete deprivation of the eco-
nomic value of the underlying property, see 535 U.S. at 332, this 
Court finds the instant circumstances to be distinguishable.  The 
Tahoe–Sierra moratorium did not extend for an entire decade.  
Moreover, this Court notes the irony of the FWS relying on the pro-
spective extinction of the very subpopulation of Karner Blues it is 
fighting to protect as an argument against finding a taking of 
Plaintiff’s property.  Accordingly, this Court concludes that the po-
tential natural destruction of the Karner Blues’ habitat does not 
preclude Plaintiff’s takings claim now. 
D. Public Trust Limits on Uses of State Navigable Waters 
Do Not Inhere in the Lear’s 1803 Congressional Grant 
of Title. 
Brittain County argues that it has no liability for a taking of 
the Cordelia Lot, as the limits on filling and developing lands un-
derwater are well-established public trust limits.  Brittain County 
relies on dicta in Lucas suggesting that, in limited circumstances, 
compensation is not required for development limits that “inhere 
in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of 
the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership.”  505 U.S. at 1029.  Brittain County argues that the 
New Union’s interest in preserving navigation and protecting 
other public trust interests in navigable waters constitutes such a 
“background principle” of State law.  However, Brittain County 
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points to no applicable New Union precedent (and this Court has 
been unable to locate any) establishing the scope of New Union’s 
protections for public trust waters.  Predicting how a New Union 
court would rule on such matters is unnecessary, however, as this 
Court finds that at the time of the 1803 grant to Cornelius Lear, 
which included lands under water within 300 feet of the shoreline, 
the United States did not recognize any public trust rights in non-
tidal navigable waters such as Lake Union.  See P.P.L. Montana 
L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012) (collecting cases 
suggesting the bed of non-tidal rivers were considered to be private 
property prior to 1810).  Thus, no public trust navigational reser-
vation can be presumed to have existed at the time of the Lear 
grant in 1803.  Brittain County also argues that, under the “equal 
footing doctrine,” the State of New Union must be presumed to 
have taken title to lands under water on the same terms as the 
thirteen original states.  See id. at 1227–28.  However, the equal 
footing doctrine does not avail Brittain County, as a prior clear con-
gressional grant gives superior title to the congressional grantee 
as against a subsequent “equal footing” claim by a State.  See 
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57–58 (1894).  Accordingly, the State 
of New Union (and by extension Brittain County) cannot claim any 
inherent public trust limits on the development of lands underwa-
ter that were part of the 1803 grant. 
E. The Cordelia Lot Has Been Completely Deprived of All 
Economic Value. 
FWS and Brittain County make two arguments against find-
ing that the ESA restrictions deprive the Cordelia Lot of all eco-
nomic value.  First, the Defendants argue that neither the ESA nor 
any other federal regulation precludes development of a residence 
in the cove area, together with a causeway for access.  Similarly, 
the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law does not prohibit 
any development in the Heath.  As a consequence, in Defendants’ 
view, neither regulation completely deprives the Cordelia Lot of all 
economic value.  Second, FWS and Brittain County argue that, in 
any event, the willingness of the Brittain County Butterfly Society 
to pay to run butterfly tours demonstrates that the property re-
tains some economic value even if it cannot be developed.  Neither 
argument is persuasive. 
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1) The Federal and Local Restrictions Must Be Com-
bined to Consider Whether a Take Has Occurred. 
FWS argues that because the ESA restrictions do not restrict 
filling of the cove area and development of a residence there (nor 
does any other federal regulation), the Cordelia Lot has not been 
completely deprivedof all economic value of by the FWS.  See Pala-
zollo, 533 U.S. at 631 (holding the existence of developable uplands 
can defeat a takings claim based on wetlands regulations affecting 
most, but not all, of property).  It is questionable whether the Pala-
zollo holding even applies where the unrestricted “land” is all ac-
tually under water and cannot be developed without fill.  However, 
in this case, unlike Palazollo, the non-federally restricted portion 
of the property cannot be developed, because of the existence of lo-
cal restrictions.  For its part, Brittain County makes the reciprocal 
argument that the Wetlands Preservation Law does not prohibit 
any construction in the causeway and Heath. 
This case presents the apparently novel question of whether a 
property owner can make a claim for a complete deprivation of eco-
nomic value of a lot where federal regulations restrict one part of 
the property and local municipal regulations restrict another part.  
Accepting FWS’s and Brittain County’s arguments would mean 
that a property owner deprived of all economic use of their property 
would be denied recourse, as the federal government and local gov-
ernment each claim that their own regulation, by itself, leaves 
some developable portion.  This situation is not unlike the case of 
a joint tort, where neither actor acting alone causes a harm, but 
both actors acting together cause a harm.  The prevailing rule is 
that, in such a case, where the harm is indivisible, each tortfeasor 
is jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff.  See Velsicol Chem. 
Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976).  Accordingly, both 
FWS and Brittain County are jointly and severally liable for any 
taking of Plaintiff’s property. 
2) Plaintiff Has Been Deprived of All Economic Use of 
Her Property. 
The Supreme Court established in Lucas that where govern-
ment regulation leaves a property owner with no economically re-
munerative use of their property, a compensable taking has oc-
curred without regard to balancing any public interests served by 
the regulation.  The Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not without 
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economically remunerative use of the property, as the Brittain 
County Butterfly Society has offered to pay Plaintiff $1,000 annu-
ally for the privilege of conducting tours on the property.  This is 
less than the amount of annual property taxes on the lot.  A piece 
of real property that incurs more in property taxes than it can gen-
erate in income is by definition without economic value.  Accord-
ingly, Plaintiff has been deprived of all economic use of her prop-
erty and is entitled to compensation from the FWS and Brittain 
County. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby entered as fol-
lows: 
1) Awarding Plaintiff $10,000 damages against defendant 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service; 
2) Awarding Plaintiff $90,000 damages against defendant 
Brittain County; and 
3) Dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment de-




/s/ Romulus N. Remus 
Romulus N. Remus 
U.S.D.J. 
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